Abstract: During the financial crisis of 2007-
Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2007 The Fed's largest program, accounting for over 25 percent of its total assets, channeled over half a trillion dollars to foreign central banks via "Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines." In these bilateral arrangements, the Fed swapped dollars for foreign currencies with other central banks that then used the dollars to provide liquidity to private institutions in their jurisdictions (Goldberg, et al 2010 , Allen and Moessner 2010 , Fleming and Klagge 2010 , McDowell 2012 .
As the only central bank capable of providing the world's financial system with an unlimited supply of dollars, the Fed became the de facto global lender of last resort. The Fed's foreign lending generated political controversy both at home and abroad. The concern overseas was that the Fed established swap agreements selectively and provided little transparency with respect to the criteria that it used to determine whether a foreign central bank would receive a swap line or not Pasricha 2010, Aizenman, Yothin and Park 2011) . Selectivity meant that a majority of countries might not have access to the Fed's swap facilities, implying that they are essentially on their own in defending themselves against financial market volatility. For these countries, Fed swap lines could not reliably substitute for reserve accumulation or dependence on the International Monetary Fund (Aizenman, Yothin and Park 2011) . 2 This ambiguity was reinforced in October 2013 when the Fed announced that it was selectively institutionalizing a portion of its global network of swap agreements by converting temporary arrangements with five central banks into permanent standing agreements.
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This left other central banks, particularly in East Asia, wondering why they had been excluded from this privileged group and whether they would be denied access to Fed swap facilities in the future (Destais 2014 , Sheng 2014 ).
In the first half of this paper, I analyze the Fed's selection of 14 foreign central banks to receive swap agreements between 2007 and 2010. I focus on swaps because the Fed had discretion over which central banks to select for these facilities and the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) made these decisions once a foreign central bank had requested a swap line (United States GAO 2011, 118) . I gather information on the criteria the FOMC used to evaluate these requests from the GAO and from the minutes of the FOMC and I find some empirical support for the Fed's stated criteria. 4 However, I also find that the best predictor of a central bank being selected by the Fed for a currency swap agreement is the exposure of U.S.
commercial banks to a foreign market (where "exposure" is measured as the share of the individual foreign market in the total consolidated foreign claims of U.S. money center banks).
This variable alone accounts for 59 percent of the variation in the dependent variable and is robust to a number of economic and financial controls. This finding suggests that the Federal
Reserve was motivated to serve as a lender of last resort for certain foreign countries at least in part because it served the economic and financial interests of the United States. This interpretation is consistent with Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) , who focus more narrowly on the Fed's selection of four emerging markets for swaps, and with McDowell's (2012) qualitative analysis of the Fed's international lending during the crisis.
Within the United States, controversy swelled over the Fed's foreign lending and contributed to a congressional backlash against the Fed's confidentiality and political
independence. This reaction is important because the Federal Reserve is beholden to the U.S.
Congress for its authorities and its independence and must therefore maintain a congressional support coalition to protect itself from legislative challenges (Grier 1991 , Hetzel 1986 , Kane 1982 largely on ideological grounds. Focusing only on Democrats (which eliminates the concern that election-year presidential politics influenced member voting), I find that right-wing Democrats were as much as 67 percentage points more likely to vote "yes" on this bill than left-wing Democrats. In short, in the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the Left became the defender of the Fed's independence and confidentiality while the Right challenged it to be more transparent, more accountable, and less "global".
Section 2 provides background on the financial crisis and a summary of the Fed's global lender-of-last-resort activities. Section 3 introduces the data, models, and results of my analyses of the Fed's currency swap arrangements. Section 4 moves to the congressional level and provides analyses of voting on the "Audit the Fed" bill. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the Fed's new support coalition in Congress and the implications for its political independence.
The Federal Reserve's Global Lending during the Crisis
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave the Fed responsibility for both setting monetary policy and for maintaining the stability of U.S. financial markets. In the latter capacity, the Fed supervises U.S. banks (as well as foreign banks with branches in the U.S. that are members of the Federal Reserve System) and provides lender-of-last-resort services to these institutions during crises. Between 2007 and 2010, the Fed provided more than a trillion dollars in emergency loans to the financial sector to address the breakdown of interbank and other money markets. According to the GAO, "the scale and nature of this assistance amounted to an unprecedented expansion of the Federal Reserve System's traditional role as lender-of-lastresort" (United States GAO 2011, 1).
The programs were unprecedented partly because of their international scope. As indicated in Table 1 , the largest program, measured in terms of the peak dollar amount of loans outstanding, was the Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines program. But "domestic" programs, such as the TAF and the CPFF were also tapped by foreign financial institutions via their branches in the United States. As Figure 1 illustrates, branches and subsidiaries of foreign institutions received more than half of the total dollar amount of TAF and CPFF loans. Foreign banks were also heavy borrowers at the Fed's discount window during the crisis. Table 2 indicates that 15 of the 30 largest borrowers at the discount window were branches or agencies of foreign banks.
The proximate reason the Fed provided last-resort loans to non-U.S. banks was that foreign banks experienced severe funding shortages in U.S. dollars after interbank markets froze in October 2008 (Shin 2012 , Goldberg, et al. 2010 , McGuire and von Peter 2009 , Allen and Moessner 2010 , Fleming and Klagge 2010 (Bordo et al 2012, 8) .
As indicated in Table 3 (Goldberg, et al. 2010 , Baba et al. 2009 ).
The (Broz 2007 , Broz 2005 , Gould 2003 ). This is because such last-resort lending ensures that the countries in which these banks are highly exposed are protected under the lender's insurance umbrella.
Beyond their size, the crucial feature that distinguishes large money-center banks from other banks is that that engage in international lending. In fact, just eleven banks account for almost all the foreign loans extended by U.S. financial institutions. According to data from the These data highlight the role of large financial institutions located in the nation's money centers (i.e., "money center banks") because these large banks conduct almost all the nation's international lending. My argument is that U.S. banks benefit when the Fed provides dollar liquidity to foreign countries in which they are highly exposed.
The bank exposure variable ranges from zero, indicating that U.S. banks had no financial claims on a country's financial and non-financial institutions in 2007, to maximum of 0.24 for the Eurozone, indicating that U.S. banks had extended nearly one-quarter of their total foreign loans to Eurozone institutions. In Model 2, the estimate for GDP share is positive and significant at the 10 percent level.
This gives some credence to the FOMC's claim that it considered the "economic mass" of a (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . 12 In all three models, the INFLATION estimate is negative and significant suggesting that the FOMC did considered "sound economic management" as a criterion for selection. Countries with higher average inflation rates over the prior decade were less likely to receive a swap agreement with 10 Data from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) .
11 Substituting U.S. exports to a country as a share of total U.S. exports produces similar results. While the estimate of DOLLAR SHORTAGES is negative as expected in both models, it is significant only in Model 4. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a country is home to a global financial center city. 15 The DOLLAR SHORTAGE estimate is negative and significant in this model, which accords with the Fed's criterion: countries with "greater need" of dollar liquidity were more likely to get a swap line from the Fed. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTER also enters positively and significantly, which supports the Fed's statements on this criterion.
Despite the introduction of controls and changes in sample size, the estimate on BANK EXPOSURE remains positive and significance across all four models in Table 4 . To get a sense of the magnitude of the effect, Figure 5 plots the predictive margins and confidence intervals of receiving a Fed swap line from Model 3, holding covariates to their means while increasing BANK EXPOSURE from its minimum to its maximum value. The figure illustrates the substantively large effect of U.S. bank exposure on the probability of receiving a Fed swap line.
When U.S. money center banks have $1 billion in claims on a country's residents, the chance of participating in a Fed swap is just 13 percent. But when U.S. banks hold $41 billion in claims on a country's residents, the probability of getting a Fed swap rises to 57 percent, a 44 percentage point increase. The loan exposure of U.S. banks appears to be a good predictor of Fed swaps. The Fed is beholden to Congress and therefore must maintain a support coalition in order to protect its independence and authority.
Congressional Voting on Ron
Ron Paul, the sponsor of the bill, was outraged by Fed's global policies: "I am surprised and deeply disturbed to learn the staggering amount of money that went to foreign banks. These lending activities provided no benefit to American taxpayers, the American economy, or even directly to American banks (Felsenthal and Zargham 2011) . According to the congressional report that accompanied his bill to the floor, the bill would allow the GAO to audit: " To control for the possibility that opposition to the Fed among right-leaning constituents is based on these material considerations, Model 3 includes SOCIAL SECURITY, which is the share of a district's population receiving OASDI benefits, and FORECLOSURE RATE, which is the share of a district's private housing stock in foreclosure. 19 The estimates are both positively signed but not significant. 20 Given that estimated effect of DW-NOMINATE remains virtually unchanged, it is fair to conclude that ideology is driving representatives' voting, not the 18 House members' ideology is at least partly a reflection of the ideology of House district constituencies (Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008, Canes-Wrone, Cogan, and Brady 2002) .
hardships endured by older constituents during the crisis. I consider the implications of this finding in the conclusion.
In Model 4, I control for additional factors to ensure that estimates on bank campaign contributions and member ideology are not spurious. BANK HQ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a representative's district is home to the headquarters to one of the nation's eleven money center banks. I expected a negative sign but the estimate is positive and not significant.
CHAMBER SENIORITY counts the number of terms representatives have served in the House.
The estimate is negative and significant, indicating that more senior Democrats were less likely to support the bill, in line with their party's whip. FINANCE COMMITTEE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a representative sits on the House Financial Services Committee. Right is now challenging the Fed to be more transparent, more accountable, and less beholden to banks while the Left is positioning itself as the defender of the Fed. I consider this historic reversal in the conclusion.
Conclusion
Due to the rapid globalization of banking in the new millennium, the Federal Reserve was forced In this paper, I explored the foreign and domestic political controversies that swirled around the Fed's swaps agreements. The foreign concern was that, as the issuer of the world's foremost international currency, the Fed held the power to pick and choose among potential swap counterparties for reasons that are not necessarily financial but might be strategic or political. I evaluated this claim and found evidence that the Fed selected foreign central banks for swaps that were important to U.S. financial interests. While I found some support for the Fed's selection criteria, as revealed by the GAO audit, the factor that most strongly and consistently correlates with a central bank obtaining a Fed swap arrangement is the extent to which large U.S. banks held financial claims on a country. This finding suggests that Fed swaps help to safeguard the financial interests of the United States and are motivated primarily by U.S.
self-interest.
One implication of this result is that central banks outside the orbit of U.S. financial interests cannot count on the Federal Reserve as a source of dollar liquidity in times of crisis.
This may help us understand why some nations are expanding regional "reserve pooling"
arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) (Henning 2009 ). It should be noted that the CMI was not used during the 2008 crisis; instead Japan, South Korea, and Singapore turned to the Fed for support via swap line agreements. This selectively, in turn, helped revitalize the CMI and prompted efforts to multilateralize and expand it to ensure that all members-not just those that are important to U.S. interests-would be able to obtain emergency funding in a crisis.
By the same token, efforts to "self-insure" against financial volatility by accumulating large foreign currency reserves have continued after the crisis (Aizenman, Yothin, and Park 2011) .
Lastly, Truman ( What is causing this historic reversal? While it is too soon to say with certainly, the analysis suggests that it is not being driven by the hardships that older, conservative home- Inasmuch as foreign banks continue to hold substantial liabilities in U.S. dollars, the Fed will be on the hook to act as a global lender of last resort since it is the only central bank that can create dollars. While its operations may be increasingly global, the Fed's legitimacy with the Right appears to end at the water's edge, leaving the Fed on the horns of a classic "globalization vs.
domestic politics" dilemma (Rodrik 2000) . With its political support in the U.S. dwindling, the Notes: The dependant variable is VOTE, a member's vote on "Audit the Fed" where "yes" = 1 and "no" = 0. Probit Models 1-4 are for Democrats only. Model 5 is for all representatives. DW-Nominate uses roll-call voting records to measures the "left-right" ideology of representatives and ranges from -1 to 1, with higher values indicating a more right-wing ideology. See the text for the definitions of other variables. 
Commerical Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
Notes: Predictive margins (with 95% confidence intervals) of a central bank receiving a Fed swap line using Model 3 from Table 4 , holding covariates to their means while increasing BANK EXPOSURE from its minimum to its maximum. 
